Identifying and Reducing Overlap in Farm Program Support by Cooper, Joseph C. & O'Donoghue, Erik J.
i 
 
Identifying and Reducing Overlap in Farm Program Support 
 








Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics 
Association’s 2011 AAEA & NAREA Joint Annual Meeting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 















♣ Joseph Cooper and Erik O’Donoghue are economists with the Economic Research 
Service, USDA, 1800 M Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20036. 
 
♠jcooper@ers.usda.gov and eodonoghue@ers.usda.gov 
 
♦The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of ERS or 
the USDA.   ii 
 
 





The current debate surrounding the 2012 Farm Act stresses cutting costs while 
maintaining, or even strengthening, farmers’ “safety net.”  One way to cut costs is to 
reduce or eliminate potential overlap of farm program payments.  Using simulations, we 
explore the interaction between the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program 
and a revenue assurance (RA) crop insurance program for corn, soybean, and wheat 
farmers in IL, MN, and SD.  Additionally, we examine whether receiving benefits from 
multiple programs (an RA program, the Supplemental Revenue (SURE) program, and an 
ad hoc disaster assistance program) distorts farmers’ business decisions.  We find overlap 
between ACRE and crop insurance, which could lead to budgetary savings if these two 
programs were to be integrated.  Moreover, despite policymakers explicitly incorporating 
insurance indemnities into SURE payment calculations, access to both programs can alter 
behavior.  Finally, in a counter-factual analysis, we show that removing ad hoc payments 
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Identifying and Reducing Overlap in Farm Program Support 
 
Introduction 
Do farm programs overlap?  While providing a support for farmers, do the programs 
interact efficiently?  If policies that currently provide a safety net for farmers interact in 
ways that duplicate coverage, government savings can be achieved by modifying or even 
eliminating programs while providing the farmer with the same level of protection 
against downside risk. 
Government policies have long been in place to support U.S. farmers.  These 
policies have addressed issues in many areas, including land distribution, productivity, 
farmers’ standard of living, marketing, risk, and more recently, conservation, biofuels, 
and trade promotion, changing focus over time in response to an evolving political 
economy (Gardner, 2002).  The evolution of agricultural commodity support programs 
since their introduction in the 1920s does not necessarily explicitly coordinate on-going 
and new programs, which can lead to programs overlapping in the measures they target  
and to potential inefficiencies in addressing those targets, at least from a strict economic 
standpoint.  
Overlap in program support can be defined in a variety of ways. It can refer to a 
producer receiving compensation in excess of losses, it can refer to receiving 
compensation in excess of what the individual programs intended, or it may refer to a set 
of programs that raise program costs while not providing additional security.  In this 
paper, we use the former definition. 
From an economic perspective, the scope for government intervention generally 
revolves around internalizing an externality.  While economics tends to be a weak 2 
 
mechanism for the analysis of allocations based on equity considerations, its strength lies 
in analyzing allocations based on efficiency arguments.  We therefore focus on 
examining impacts on farm wealth, government costs, transfers between groups, and 
market impacts.  
We begin with an overview of the various forms of support producers receive, 
e.g., Title I commodity support in the 2008 Farm Act, disaster assistance (both ad hoc 
support and formal support through 2008 Farm Act’s Supplemental Revenue Assistance 
(SURE)), subsidies for Federal crop insurance premiums, commodity loan programs, and 
support for conservation efforts (both land retirement and working lands), where we 
focus on taxpayer-funded programs.  We discuss how these various forms of support 
relate to each other based on our definitions of overlap.  
The main thrust of our analysis is to demonstrate how to empirically assess the 
extent to which formally integrating various support policies that target similar aspects of 
the “farm safety net” can result in reduced government costs while still protecting 
farmers against downside risk (or other policy goals). We simulate the overlap of crop 
insurance and counter-cyclical Title I support (in particular, the Average Crop Revenue 
Election (ACRE) revenue payments) for a set of corn, soybean, and wheat producers.  
Additionally, using the examples of disaster assistance and federal crop insurance, we 
demonstrate the use of the expected utility model to explore how overlap in coverage 
between programs can affect the producer’s production decisions.   
For our farms, we find that the ACRE program appears to cover significant 
portions of a farmer’s downside revenue risk, even using National-level yield triggers.  
As we alter the triggers from National- to State- and county-level yield triggers, overlap 3 
 
with crop revenue insurance products increases.  Thus, if ACRE and crop insurance were 
to be integrated, crop insurance premiums would drop—in some cases significantly 
(depending on crop and location).  Additionally, in a counter-factual analysis, not 
including ad hoc disaster payments in the SURE calculation would likely alter coverage 
and planting decisions.  The directions and magnitudes of the changes depend on the 
supply elasticity of land and the parameters of federal crop insurance premiums. 
 
Overview of Support 
U.S. government payments to farmers effectively fall into four main categories: 
commodity, conservation, risk management, and disaster assistance programs. 
Commodity payments tend to reflect present or past production of specific commodities 
(mostly feed and food grains, cotton, and oilseeds). Commodity program payments 
generally make up the bulk of all government payments paid directly to farmers. Based 
on calculations using data from the ERS website, over the 10-year period between 1999 
and 2008, commodity payments fluctuated between 53 and 80 percent of total 
government program payments paid to farmers.  These programs include: 
•  Direct and Counter-cyclical (CCP) payments, together called the DCP program.  
These payments are based on the producer’s historical production of program 
crops; farmers receive direct payments based on fixed crop rates set in farm 
legislation and collect CCP payments if market prices fall below statutory target 
prices.  
•  Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) and marketing loan gains, collectively called 
“marketing loan benefits” (MLBs), are tied to current prices and production.  To 4 
 
obtain capital, a farmer may use crop production as collateral to acquire a 
government commodity loan.  If the farmer defaults, the government takes the 
crop and ends up incurring storage costs.  As a result, Congress introduced MLBs 
to reduce the costs of stock accumulation by providing incentives for farmers to 
market their commodities.  If prices drop below the commodity loan rate, the 
farmer may pay the loan back at the market rate, generating a marketing loan 
gain.  LDPs provide a way for farmers to obtain the benefits from a marketing 
assistance loan without actually having to take out a loan.   
 
Commodity programs have traditionally been tied to current production and prices 
using price supports and supply controls.  However, coupled payments distort farmers’ 
production decisions.  To minimize these distortions, Congress introduced Production 
Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments in 1996—the precursor to today’s DCP program—
that largely decoupled payments from current production decisions and eliminated most 
supply controls.
1  Today, direct payments make up the bulk of commodity payments, 
totaling roughly $5 billion per year over the life of the 2008 Farm Act, and farmers 
receive these payments regardless of planting decisions, production outcomes, or current 
market conditions. Support in the agricultural sector for these direct payments is mixed. 
For example, the Iowa Farm Bureau has called for an end to the payments, suggesting 
that the funds would be put to better use to strengthen the crop insurance program (Pillar, 
2010; Anderson, 2010; Laws, 2010a/b). 
                                                 
1 Although largely decoupled, with few exceptions, farmers cannot plant fruits and vegetables on the DCP 
program’s base acreage without losing program benefits. 5 
 
Conservation payments are designed to promote environmentally sound farm 
business practices. For example, programs encourage goals aimed at reducing soil 
erosion, improving air and water quality, and maintaining and improving wildlife 
habitats.  They consist of two main types:  
•  Land-retirement programs—the largest being the Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP)—aimed at retiring environmentally sensitive land from production.
2  These 
types of programs tend to offer annual rental payments and cost-share assistance 
in return for a farmer establishing long-term land conservation efforts.  
•  Working land programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP) and Conservation Stewardship Program (CStP), which aim to enhance the 
farm operators’ resource management on cropland and grazing lands currently in 
production. 
In 2008, roughly 60 percent of all conservation payments consisted of land-retirement 
program funds dedicated to the CRP.  The majority of recent increases in conservation 
payments, however, have accrued to the working-land programs, which target payment to 
different indicators (e.g., costs of more environmentally benign management practices) 
than do commodity support programs.   
Programs that effectively help farmers mitigate risk include the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) and the federal crop insurance program.
3  Introduced in the 
2008 Farm Act, the Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) provides eligible farmers 
with counter-cyclical support tied to crop revenues.  To limit the overlap of multiple 
                                                 
2 Other land-retirement programs include the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), the Farmable Wetlands 
Reserve Program (FWP), and the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP).     
3 We use the term “effective” to denote the quantitative impacts of these programs, and not to necessarily 
suggest the intended policy goals of the program.  6 
 
government programs, farmers enrolled in the ACRE program cannot receive CCP 
payments, must forfeit 20 percent of their direct payments, and take a 30 percent 
reduction in loan rates for potential marketing loan benefits.  In return, farmers can 
receive state-based revenue guarantees based on the 5-year State Olympic average yield 
and the 2-year national average prices, with limits on how much the guarantee can rise or 
fall from one year to the next.   
Farmers can also choose to purchase federal crop insurance that is provided via 
private-sector insurance companies.  Although these companies sell and service the 
individual insurance policies, the government plays a large role—helping develop and 
approve the premium rates, generating and administering the premium subsidies, and 
reinsuring the commercial insurance providers (USDA, RMA, 2010). For commodities 
that are not covered under the crop insurance program, a catastrophic coverage insurance 
can be obtained, called the Non-Insured Assistance Program (NAP), similar to the 
catastrophic coverage (CAT) available for program crops.  If commodity prices remain 
high relative to marketing loan rates in Title I of the Farm Act, then price-based support 
in Title I will fall. Forecasts suggest that in such a case, crop insurance may account for a 
substantially larger share of total government agricultural support than in the past (CBO; 
FAPRI, 2011).   
Finally, the 2008 Farm Act introduced a permanent disaster assistance program 
which formally provides disaster payments to eligible farmers.  The crop version of this 
newly created permanent disaster assistance program, the Supplemental Revenue 
Assistance Payments (SURE) program—a free supplement to crop insurance—provides 7 
 
additional whole-farm coverage for producers with crop insurance for crop production or 
crop quality losses. 
Together, farm programs were calculated to cost roughly $200 billion dollars over 
ten years.  Based on Congressional Budget Office projections for outlays from 2008-2017 
downloaded from the ERS website, the ten-year cost of commodity programs was 
estimated to be roughly 75 billion dollars, the cost of conservation programs to approach 
58 billion dollars, and the cost to provide crop insurance to come to nearly 62 billion 
dollars. 
 
Potential Program Interactions 
Much of the debate on the negotiations for the 2012 Farm Act round stresses the need to 
cut costs while maintaining, or even strengthening, a safety net for farmers.  One way to 
cut costs is to reduce or eliminate the potential overlap of various programs.  Some farm 
program mechanisms may be designed to protect the farmer in a manner designed 
explicitly to avoid overlap or duplicative compensation.  In other cases, however, if 
programs have similar goals—protecting farm income, for example—quite different 
programs may overlap if producers participate in multiple programs for multiple 
commodities without reference to their cumulative effect on farm revenue.   
For example, while ACRE enrollment requires giving up some commodity 
program benefits, the program’s design does not preclude direct overlap with other 
agricultural support programs (such as crop insurance), allowing for the possibility of 
duplicating coverage across programs.  In contrast, the newly introduced disaster 
assistance program, SURE, includes both crop insurance and ACRE income in the whole 8 
 
farm revenue on which the calculation of payments is based, ensuring that farmers do not 
receive double payments.  As a result, the ACRE program has received a lot of recent 
attention concerning the potential for overlap with other farm programs from both 
policymakers and researchers alike. 
For example, at a House Agriculture Committee hearing in May 2010, Bruce 
Babcock, Director of the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development and Professor of 
Agricultural Economics at Iowa State University, testified that the ACRE program 
“duplicates coverage that is available from the crop insurance program” (Babcock, 2010).   
While Babcock suggests the two programs are wholly overlapping, others have countered 
that these programs cover different parts of producer price and revenue risks and only 
overlap to a small degree (e.g., Zulauf et al., 2010).  A recent study by Cooper (2010) 
simulates interaction between the programs and finds overlap that, if accounted for, 
would lead to 10 to 41 percent drops in crop insurance premiums, depending on the 
farm/crop combination examined. 
Earlier studies have also explored the possibility for overlap between CCPs and 
crop insurance and the potential for duplication between CCPs and marketing assistance 
loans. Findings suggest little overlap between the risk protection provided by CCPs and 
crop insurance since CCPs effectively covers inter-year risk while crop insurance 
effectively covers intra-year risk (Hauser et al., 2004).  Additionally, results indicate 
potential price protection duplication between the loan program and CCPs, resulting from 
the way in which the production incentives inherent in LDPs interact with the 
combination of loan rate and target price in the CCP payment calculation – 9 
 
notwithstanding the fact that the CCP payment calculation explicitly accounts for the loan 
rate (and direct payment rate) (Hart and Babcock, 2005).   
At least one study has also examined how traditional commodity programs and 
conservation or agri-environmental programs interact (Morehart and Claassen, 2006), 
finding little, if any, overlap  under current program designs; they argue that attempts to 
meld the two types of programs would likely fail to meet the goals of either.  While 
policymakers might possibly use the Conservation Stewardship Program (CStP), which 
pays producers for increasing levels of environmentally enhancing farming practices, to 
target income support, in general, the overlap of conservation programs with income 
support would likely focus on reducing the costs of investing in potentially revenue-
enhancing practices.   
Cost-reimbursement programs, typically used with conservation and agri-
environmental programs, have been scrutinized by the GAO for the potential of producer 
overpayment—both in terms of payment beyond costs and for multiple payments under 
different programs for the same practice (GAO, 2009).  Some cases of overcompensation 
may result from programs designed to make payments based on local cost estimates 
rather than individual costs, but most examples revolve around fraud rather than 
inefficient program design. 
 
ACRE 
In this paper, we explore the interactions between various commodity support 
combinations involving ACRE, crop insurance, and SURE.  These three programs are 10 
 
fairly complex, so outlining how they work will be essential to understanding the 
potential for overlap between these and other farm programs. 
ACRE is a state-based revenue guarantee for participants based on the 5-year 
State Olympic average yield and the 2-year national average price. Once a farm is 
enrolled in ACRE, all eligible crops on that farm are enrolled in the program.
4 The ACRE 
revenue payment (denoted as ACREijt) to producer i of crop j in period t is (leaving out 
the state subscript):  





 · {0.85 or 
0.83 depending on the year} · ( ijt A ) , 
where:   ijt Φ  is an indicator variable that equals 1 when the farm’s actual revenue (farm’s 
yield times national crop year price for crop year t) for crop j is less than 
the farm’s benchmark revenue ( “Olympic” moving average yield per 
planted acre [the average of the prior 5 years of yield data with the highest 
and lowest values removed] times 2-year national moving average crop 
year price plus the premium paid for crop insurance for crop j) for crop 
year t, and 0 otherwise; 
PGRtj is ACRE Program Guarantee Revenue for crop j in crop year t, calculated 
as the 5-year State Olympic moving average yield per planted acre 
(removes high and low yield) times the 2-year national moving average 
crop year price times 90%; 
                                                 
4  For ACRE administration purposes, the farm is an “FSA farm”. Note that a farmer may own multiple 
FSA farms. 11 
 
ASRtj is Actual State Revenue for crop j in period t, calculated as state yield for 
crop year t times the higher of the U.S. average cash price for the 
marketing year t or 70 percent of crop’s marketing assistance loan rate; 
( ) jt YS E  is Benchmark State Yield, calculated as the 5-year Olympic average of 
the State’s yield per planted acre; 
( ) ij Y E  is Benchmark Farm i Yield, calculated using the same formula as for the 
state benchmark yield j; and 
ijt A is acres planted to crop j in period t. 
 
Several limitations apply to the ACRE payments.  For example, for 2010-12, PGR 
cannot increase or decrease more than 10 percent from its value from the previous year.  
Further, ACRE payment acreage is limited to the total amount of base acres on the farm.  
Base acres are fixed levels of acreage based on historic acreage on the farm and are used 
to calculate certain government payment.  See USDA (2008) for additional details.  
From the producer’s perspective, a potential benefit (or liability) of ACRE over 
the LDP and the CCP is that the ACRE’s guarantee revenue automatically rebalances 
itself to relatively recent market prices. Therefore, it can provide payments in situations 
in which market prices are well above statutory loan rates and target prices. Of course, 
when market prices are low relative to loan rates and target prices, the ACRE revenue 
payment would likely provide lower mean benefits than the LDP plus the CCP (albeit 
leaving differences in the fixed payments out of the analysis).  However, under current 
market prices, loan rates, and target prices, feed grain and oilseed producers have a 
negligible chance of receiving either CCPs or LDPs. For these producers, the decision to 12 
 
participate in ACRE is likely to be based instead on the producer’s perceived trade-off 
between the 20 percent of direct payments forgone when participating in ACRE and the 
ACRE revenue payment.   For our national- and county-level ACRE scenarios below, we 
replace PGR, ASR, and YS with national or county level values.   
 
Federal Crop Insurance 
A farmer’s decision to purchase a crop insurance policy depends heavily upon the 
premium rates set by the government.  While the USDA is tasked with creating 
actuarially fair premiums, the rates are, at best, actuarially fair on average, given that the 
rates are not determined using individual-specific yield risk measures.  Additionally, the 
government subsidizes a portion of the rates, increasing farmers’ returns to adoption. 
While a variety of Federal crop insurance products are available, we focus on Revenue 
Assurance (RA), which makes it directly applicable to both the ACRE and SURE 
programs.  Under the base price option, an RA indemnity is paid when realized revenue 
falls below the guarantee, which equals the RA base price multiplied by the producer’s 
Actual Production History (APH yield)     and the coverage level θ. The per-acre 
indemnity is:      




it it y p y p p y I − = θ θ , 0 max ) , , (  
where
b
it p is the RA base price,  it p is the RA realized price (both prices defined by futures 




Finally, provided a farmer purchases crop insurance (or NAP, for noninsured crops), the 
producer immediately becomes eligible for Supplemental Revenue Assistance (SURE), a 
whole farm revenue program. A farmer may only receive SURE payments if their 
operation is located in a county where a disaster has been declared, in a county 
contiguous to a disaster county, or if they personally suffered production losses 
amounting to 50 percent or more of normal production levels.  Additionally, producers 
must suffer a 10 percent production loss to at least one crop of economic significance on 
their farm. For an individual, the SURE payment amounts to: 
(3)  ) 0 ), ( 60 . 0 max(
T
t t t t R G D SURE − ∗ = , 
where  t G is the SURE guarantee and 
T
t R is total farm revenue, and where t D  equals 1 if a 
farmer is eligible for SURE payments, and 0 otherwise. The value of “normal” (i.e., 





ity p ) ( . The value of actual production on the farm is the sum of the value of 




ity p ) ( . Note that both values of the production are based on 
the price election for the insured commodity.  
The SURE guarantee (Gt) depends on the level of crop insurance coverage 
selected by the producer, expected prices, and the producer’s APH yield, but is limited to 
















it it t y y p a y p a G ) , max( 90 . 0 , ) ( 2 . 1 min θ   
where  jt a  is planted acreage of crop j (or acreage where planting was prevented) and
C
jt y  
is the producer’s counter-cyclical payment program yield or an “adjusted yield”.  Total 14 
 
farm revenue explicitly includes market revenue, commodity program payments, federal 
disaster payments, and net crop insurance indemnities: 
[]
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=   15 . 0 ) , , ( ) , ( , 0 max ) 5 ( θ θ
 
where ) , , (
b
jt jt p y PREM θ is the producer paid insurance premium per acre,  t MLB  is the 
producer’s (farm-level) total marketing loan benefits summed across all eligible crops 
produced by the farmer, t DP  is the producer’s total direct payment, t CCP  is the producer’s 
total counter-cyclical payment,  t ACRE  is the farmer’s total revenue payments under the 
Average Crop Revenue Election program summed across all the farmer’s eligible planted 
acres in all eligible crops, where  t CCP  and  t ACRE  are mutually exclusive, and AHt are 
other federal disaster payments covering the same disaster.
5 The price 
N
jt p is the “National 
Average Market Price” as determined by USDA’s Deputy Administrator. 
 
Methods and Data 
To estimate the distribution of payments for a given reference crop year t, given 
stochastic season average prices and realized yield at pre-planting time in t, we follow the 
methods developed in (Cooper 2009, 2010).  First, national average yields (obtained from 
the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)) are re-expressed as within-season 




Y E Y −
, where expected yields,
                                                 
5 If the eligible farmer chooses to be in enrolled in the Average Crop Revenue Election program (ACRE) 
rather than in the traditional commodity program, then the CCP payment in t is replaced by an ACRE 
revenue payment, DP’s are reduced by 20% and the loan rate in the MLB by 30%. 15 
 
) ( jt Y E , are estimated by regressing national average yields on a linear trend using data 
for 1975-2008.  County yields, obtained from NASS, are also transformed to deviation 
form (denoted as 
k
jt Y Δ ) where k indexes the county.   
  Realized harvest prices are also transformed into deviation form:  jt P Δ  =  




P E P −
 where ) ( jt P E is the planting time expected price.  We follow RMA 
definitions for expected and realized prices used in RA insurance.  The expected price of 
corn is the average of daily closing prices in February for the December Chicago Board 
of Trade (CBOT) corn contract.  The realized price is the average of daily closing prices 
during October for the CBOT December corn contract.  Expected and realized soybean 
prices are based on the February and October prices, respectively, for the December 
CBOT soybean contract.  For hard red spring wheat, expected and realized prices are 
based on March and August prices, respectively, for the Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
(MGE) September contract.     
Cooper (ibid.) discusses the simulation of  jt P  in a manner that preserves their 
inverse correlation with national level yield.   The relationship between price and yield 
vectors is estimated by regressing  j P Δ  on j Y Δ and other explanatory variables ( j z ): 
(6)  jt P Δ  =  () jt jt jt z Y ε + Δ , g   







< 0, i.e., the greater the realization 
of national average yield over the expected level, the more likely harvest time price will 
be lower than the expected price. See Cooper (ibid.) for details.  16 
 
Using a bootstrap approach based on the econometric relationship between 
national price and yield deviates as well as other variables, S vectors of (1×T)  prices are 
simulated for each element of a (G×1) vector of a simulated national yields 
* N Y , where S 
= G = 1000, for a total of 1,000,000 price-yield pairs.  Using an inverse PDF approach, 
the 
* N Y  is drawn from a kernel density function estimated from NASS national level data 
over 1975 to 2008, thereby providing support to positively or negatively skewed 
distributions.   A (G×1) vector of county yields (
* C
j Y ) is similarly generated from kernel 
density functions estimated from NASS county level yield data for each crop and county 
examined here, as are (G×1) vectors of state level yields (
* S
j Y ).  The Pearson correlations 
observed between national, state, and county yields over the observation period are 
imposed on the simulated yield vectors using a heuristic combinatorial approach (ibid.).  
In essence, this approach re-sorts the county, state, and national yield values until the 
correlation between the three simulated vectors converges on the observed correlations.  
Finally, farm level yields, 
* F Y , are generated from the county level marginal densities 
using the approach discussed in the next section. 
Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of revenue for a representative corn famer in 
Hyde County, SD, using 2009 prices.  We have not yet discussed the specifics of how the 
support programs depicted in the figure work, but the motivation for this figure is to 
provide some intuition for what estimated densities can look like, and to visualy depict 
the support overlap. The RA insurance net indemnity payment truncates the farmer’s 
revenue density below 70% of his expected revenue. The stylized ad hoc payment 
reimburses the farmer when county actual revenue is below 70% of expected county 17 
 
revenue.  In this example, adding county-based ad hoc payment on top of gross revenue 
plus the RA net indemnity payment has no impact on the farmer’s downside risk.  The 
shaded area reflects the increase ($8) in the farmer’s expected revenue per acre  due to 
the overlap between the two programs in targeting downside risk.   
  
 
Cost Savings From Reducing Overlap between Federal Crop Insurance and ACRE 
We now examine to what extent crop insurance premiums could decrease if the harvest 
time revenue used in the premium calculations included the ACRE revenue payment.  
Given that the government subsidizes 59 percent of a farmer’s insurance premium, on 
average, integrating the two programs and decreasing premiums would likely result in 
Federal budgetary savings.  If the ACRE and insurance programs were to be formally 
integrated, we would expect that the closer the correlation between the ACRE payment 
and the farmer’s revenue losses, the greater the decrease in the insurance premium.  
Given the complex interactions between farm and county level ACRE triggers, 
the extent of the budgetary saving is more tractable to address empirically rather than 
analytically. We therefore generate farm level yields from the simulated county level 
yields using an approach that infers the standard deviation of farm level yields from the 
RMA (pre-subsidy) crop insurance premiums, while assuming that the only difference 
between a farm and the county yield density is an inflation of the standard deviation of 
yield, defined (leaving out subscripts denoting the farmer and the county) for crop j in 
year t as  
* F
jt Y = 
* C
jt Y + zt, where z~ () ()




jt Y Y N − σ , where z refers to idiosyncratic risk 
that defines the difference between the representative farm yield and the county yield.  In 
our application of the Coble and Dismukes (2008) approach to backing-out the farm level 18 
 
standard deviation of yield from crop insurance premiums from the Risk Management 
Agency (RMA) of the USDA, we assume that our representative farmers purchase 
revenue assurance (RA) with the base price option and 70 percent coverage (USDA, 
2009).    The RA indemnity payment per acre for crop j in period t can then be written as:  
(7) jt RA  = max{0, ( ()




jt jt Y P Y P E ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ )}, 
where  ( ) jt P E  and  jt P are expected and harvest time futures prices, respectively, and 
APH
jt Y
is the actual production history for the farm.  In our simulation context, the insurance 
premium, jt PREM , is actuarially correct if it is set equal to  ( ) jt RA E , the mean of all 
outcomes of (7) given our (S x G) matrix of prices and (G x 1) vector of farm yields.   




jt Y Y − σ  that 
minimizes  ( ) ( ) jt jt RA E PREM abs − , where  it PREM  is the full premium including the 
farmer paid portion and the portion subsidized by the government. The farmer paid 
premium for 2009 is calculated with the RMA website (RMA, 2011) using the APH yield 
values in Table 1 and dividing by 0.41 to generate the full premium jt PREM .  
  So that our results for the cost savings of integrating ACRE with crop insurance 
are conservative, we use RMA premium rates for basic units (the RMA designation for 
specific farm fields) rather than for enterprise units (an aggregation of a farmer’s fields), 
the latter of which will tend to have lower insurance rates.  Similarly, we do not remove 
from the premium the load factor that adjusts for catastrophic risk.   Hence, our farm 
level risk is likely higher than average, thereby underplaying the potential cost savings.   
If RA was to explicitly consider ACRE revenue payments as part of harvest time 
revenue, the  jt RA from (7) would be rewritten as:  19 
 






jt jt ACRE Y P Y P E + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ }.  
  Table 1 shows the results of the integration for the State level ACRE that was first 
offered in 2009, as well as for hypothetical national and county level ACRE programs, 
the latter an idea endorsed by the Iowa Farm Bureau (Clayton, 2010). Cost savings range 
from 6 to 45 percent across all the tested scenarios and 20 to 38 percent under the state 
ACRE program. As expected, the reduction in insurance premiums is greater the more 
closely tied the ACRE payment is to the farm level. Hence, benefits are greatest with a 
county level ACRE. Nonetheless, benefits are still significant even with national level 
ACRE.   
A more comprehensive analysis of the premium reductions over more crops and 
counties is outside the scope of this paper, but the examples should suffice to show 
substantial cost reductions of incorporating ACRE into the crop insurance program. Note 
however, that the extent of the expected benefits will vary from year to year, and will be 
particularly sensitive to: (a) the extent that the ACRE guarantee price departs from the 
arguably less naïve expected price from the futures market; and (b), the extent to which 
the floor or ceiling on the ACRE program guarantee review is binding.  
 
Producer Response to Overlap in Support: a Simulation for Disaster Assistance  
The section above provides an example of the financial accounting for support overlap. 
However, any support overlap that changes the farmer’s density function of wealth, 
income, or profit can change the farmer’s behavior, particularly if the farmer is not risk 
neutral. While changes in the farmer’s behavior can be manifested in a variety of input 
and output choices decisions, here we focus on how overlap in coverage between SURE 
and ad hoc can affect insurance demand (the farmer’s choice of the insurance coverage 20 
 
rate θ), and planted acres.  We assume that ad hoc disaster assistance comes in the form 
of USDA Secretarial declarations, although it can come in a variety of forms (hence the 
ad hoc), including Congressional legislation written to cover specific disaster events. 
USDA Secretarial disaster declarations require a 30 percent or greater yield loss due to 
natural disaster in at least one crop in a county, and require that the state governor make a 
request to the USDA for disaster assistance (FSA, 2009).  
In our simple quantitative model of the political economy of the ad hoc process, 
we assume that the state governor makes the request with 100 percent probability 
whenever the yield loss criterion is met.  We specify the farmer’s ad hoc disaster 
payment rate that is tied to county losses and payable to the farmer’s planted acreage in 






j j a y y r p AH * , 0 max * − =ϕ , where r is the disaster trigger rate 
(which we set at 0.70, as per current USDA rules for Secretarial disaster assistance), and 







j y y r p − , 0 max > 0, where we assume that ϕ  = 1.  To show the potential for 
payment overlap of not integrating ad hoc and the standing SURE program, we consider 
a hypothetical SURE program (denoted as HSURE) that does not include ad hoc 
payments in the SURE payment calculation. 
Given the approach to modeling joint price and yield densities functions described 
earlier, Table 2 shows the impact of SURE and HSURE on a spring wheat farmer in 
Hyde County, SD. Table 2 shows that the ad hoc assistance, as well as SURE or HSURE 
and RA insurance, contributes to increasing the expected revenue of the Hyde county 
farmer and reducing his downside risk.  Note that when we exclude the ad hoc assistance 
from integration with insurance/HSURE support, the downside risk (as measured in the 21 
 
lower bound of the 90 percent confidence interval) remains unchanged while mean total 
revenue has increased.  Thus, the ad hoc program appears to overlap the 
insurance/HSURE support, inefficiently duplicating payments to farmers. 
We use the empirical data summarized in Table 2 in the simulation of expected 
utility (EU) maximizing behavior by this Hyde county farmer. A priori, we expect actions 
that increase the farmer’s mean wealth and/or decrease the variance of wealth to be EU 
maximizing, and we expect changes in higher moments of the wealth distribution to 
affect EU as well.   
We assume that the farmer has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and 
chooses acreage and insurance coverage to maximize the expected value of a negative 
exponential utility function over G·S = 1,000,000 simulated price and yield, and 
insurance combinations as  





















where λ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient and w is wealth in this concave von 
Neumann Morgenstern utility function. Wealth w is  o w  plus net returns under six risk 
reduction program alternatives: 1) no insurance coverage; 2) insurance coverage; 3) 
insurance coverage and ad hoc payments; 4) insurance coverage and HSURE payments 
(where SURE is same as HSURE in this case); 5) insurance coverage, HSURE, and ad 
hoc payments; and 6) insurance coverage, SURE, and ad hoc payments.   Wealth wk 
under each scenario includes direct payments for corn, soybeans, and wheat, with the 
share of payments for each crop based on the number of base acres in each crop in the 
county, valued at the base yield rates for that county, with the total value of these 
payments being DP = $6.86  per acre for the Hyde farmer. Note that these annual fixed 22 
 
payments do not require production of the crops; we therefore include the soybean and 
corn direct payments regardless of whether our farmer has decided to grow only spring 
wheat. 
Wealth wk for each price-yield realization k is defined (in multicrop format) as: 
(10) 




























jk j o AH PREM a I a D C y p a DP w k w θ θ , 
where Cj is the production cost for each crop j, Dk is the total HSURE payment (if 
applicable to the scenario), Ijk(θ) is the per acre insurance indemnity, PREMjk(θ) is the 
insurance premium, and AHj are ad hoc disaster payments.  Note that under current 
expected prices, the probability of marketing loan benefits and counter-cyclical payments 
being issued are zero for the crops in question, and as such, are not included in wk.  
The mean and standard deviation of the spring wheat yield for this farmer are 
37.65 and 20 (bu/acre), respectively. The expected output price is $6.20 ($/bu, 2009).  
Fertilizer and all other costs – used for the cost functions Ci – are based on ERS/USDA 
cost estimates for the region that includes South Dakota. To reflect increasing marginal 
costs as additional acreage is brought into production, and to reduce the probability of 
corner solutions in the simulations, we assume quadratic cost functions (e.g., Howitt, 
1995) for each crop j,  ()
2
1 0 j j j a a C ν ν + =  , where  0 ν is the parameter on the constant 
marginal costs, and is $65.54.  The increasing marginal costs parameter is  1 ν , which we 
assume is fertilizer, and  1 ν  = $44.21.  
We assume the farmer has a moderate risk aversion premium of 20 percent (e.g., 
Hurley, Mitchell, and Rice, 2004; Mitchell, Gray, Steffey, 2004). The associated absolute 23 
 
risk aversion coefficient λ  (equation 9) is scaled to the standard deviation of net revenue 
for the one acre farm using the approach in Babcock, Choi, and Feinerman (1993).
6 We 
normalize our farm to one acre.  For the sake of transparency in the results, initial wealth 
o w  is set high enough so that the farmer’s budget constraint is never binding, and as such, 
relationships between marginal benefits and costs determine the activity levels.  
While the actual range for RA coverage is 55 (or 65) to 85 percent, we let the 
insurance coverage rate vary between 0 and 100 percent in our constrained optimization 
(a Lagrangian function using quadratic optimization), which allows us to find the 
farmer’s optimal coverage level.   Table 3 provides the simulation results for the 6 risk 
reduction program choices for three scenarios with differing combinations of land supply 
and actuarial fairness assumptions. The assumptions for actuarial fairness are either : i) 
the crop insurance premium is actuarially fair before the government insurance subsidy is 
applied, and hence, the final premium is “super fair” from an actuarial perspective 
(scenario 1); or ii) the actuarially fair premium is multiplied by 1/(1-0.59) before the 
government insurance subsidy is applied, and hence, the actual farmer paid premium is 
close to be being actuarially fair at a 70% coverage level, but fairness at other coverage 
rates depends on the RMA subsidy schedule (RMA, 2008), as in scenarios (1) and (3).   
In addition, we use two alternatives for the supply of land: i) supply is completely 
inelastic (in scenarios 1 and 2), and ii) supply is completely elastic (scenario 3). The 
actual cropland situation is closer to those in scenarios (1) and (3), but we include 
scenario (3) to show what the farmer would do if land was infinitely obtainable. Of 
                                                 
6 For the Hyde farmer, our baseline standard deviation of $107.19 evaluated over 
our SxG simulated price and yield combinations, θ =0.7, quadratic cost functions, and no 
SURE or ad hoc payments yields λ equal to 0.003835.  
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course, one could use an elasticity of land supply between these two extremes, but doing 
so would further complicate the results without adding insights pertinent to the issue we 
examine. 
For “RA insurance”  (row b) under  scenario 1 (actuarially fair premium and 
completely inelastic land supply) in Table 3, the farmer chooses a 67% insurance 
coverage rate (θ). As expected, in row (c), adding in ad hoc assistance lowers the farmers 
demand for insurance coverage (to 65%).  Also, as expected, making HSURE available 
(row d)  raises the demand for insurance (to 75%), and these results are the same for 
SURE, given that there is no ad hoc assistance in this case.  Making ad hoc available 
when the farmer has HSURE (row e) leaves the coverage rate at 75%.   Making ad hoc 
available when the farmer has the actual SURE (row f) also leaves the coverage rate at 
75%.   Note that this 75% figure is actually infinitesimally below 75%, as moving to 75% 
lowers the RMA premium subsidy rate, and hence, the stickiness at (slightly below) 75%. 
For scenario 2 (actuarially super fair premium and completely inelastic land 
supply) in Table 3, the farmer chooses an 80% insurance coverage rate θ in each case in 
rows (b)-(f). This choice level is unaffected by the presence of ad hoc payments or 
SURE. Note that the stickiness at 80% is in part due to the premium subsidy rates falling 
for insurance coverage 80% and over.  
Our Scenario 3 (actuarially fair premium and completely elastic land supply) is 
the most complex of the three as planted acres can vary, thus allowing us to examine 
production impacts.  In this scenario, the famer chooses an insurance coverage rate of 
80% in rows (a) – (f), and what varies is planted acreage.  Relative to the base scenario 
(row a), adding crop insurance (row b) increases planted acreage, which is not a 25 
 
surprising result. Adding ad hoc on top of insurance (row c) further increases acreage; 
again, not surprising.  The combination of RA insurance and HSURE –  or equivalently 
in this ad hoc-free case – SURE (row d) results in the highest planted acreage.  
Interestingly, adding ad hoc payments to insurance and HSURE or SURE (rows e and f) 
actually results in lower planted acreage than in rows (c) or (d), but still higher than with 
RA insurance alone (row b); interactions between crop insurance, SURE, and ad hoc 
assistance are complex enough that relative production impacts are not always a priori 
evident.  Because SURE explicitly account for ad hoc support (row f), it does have a 
smaller impacts on planted acreage than HSURE (row e). 
In a deterministic analysis, Smith and Watts (2010) find that SURE has the 
potential for creating moral hazard conditions on top of those already associated with 
Federal crop insurance. That is a result we expect in a stochastic analysis as well, and is 
suggested by the production impacts in our simulations.  However, our simulation 
exercise makes the point that allowing multiple inputs to simultaneously change makes it 
not only more difficult to judge a priori the effects of adding a non-overlapping programs 
(i.e., SURE on top of RA), but overlapping support (ad hoc assistance) as well.  
 
Conclusions 
Our simulation results show that reducing overlap between the ACRE program and crop 
insurance would save the government money while maintaining farmers’ protection 
against downside risk.  By integrating the two programs, the government could eliminate 
duplicate payments to farmers when production losses occur.  Moreover, crop insurance 
policy premiums would drop over time.   26 
 
Despite lower premiums, integrating support would probably generate a negative 
net benefit to the producer since the farmer would no longer receive duplicative 
payments— the reduction in overlap would likely mean a lower total expected revenue 
(including the government support).  Hence, integrating these programs could lower 
incentives for farmers to enroll in ACRE.  One policy mechanism to prevent such a 
response is for Title I only to include the ACRE program and not allow the producer the 
option of staying with the traditional (price-based) support approaches.  
It is possible that today’s political climate may increase the chances of integrating 
ACRE with crop insurance as many—including farmers and policymakers—are 
questioning the need, or even desirability, of maintaining a program that pays farmers 
irrespective of need.  Indeed, the Iowa Farm Bureau has argued for a three-pronged 
approach to altering farm programs: (1) eliminate the DCP program, (2) use the funding 
for the DCP program to strengthen the crop insurance program, and (3) base ACRE 
payment calculations on county- rather than state-level yields and revenues (Pillar, 2010; 
Anderson, 2010).   
Our analysis of establishing ACRE program payments on county rather than state 
level yields and prices suggests that the program would increase farmers’ coverage of 
farm-level revenue risk. However, feasibility concerns arise when contemplating 
structuring the ACRE program on county- instead of state-level data.  Currently, 
calculating ACRE payments based on state level yields and revenues already is a time 
consuming and relatively long process – whereby farmers receive payments well after the 
growing season has passed.  These problems would only be exacerbated when using 
county level data since this information would be more costly and take longer to collect.  27 
 
At the other extreme of aggregation, we found that, even if the ACRE payment was 
generated at the national level, the program still covered a significant portion of the farm-
level revenue risk, and payments generated at the state level, as currently legislated, cover 
an even larger share of the farm-level risk.   
When exploring how the SURE program interacts with a revenue assurance crop 
insurance program and ad hoc disaster assistance programs, we found that the 
interactions between these three programs can cause a variety of reactions on the part of 
producers – including increasing or decreasing coverage and increasing or decreasing the 
number of planted acres, at least in the case of a spring wheat farmer in South Dakota.  
These different outcomes are sensitive to assumptions regarding elasticity of land supply 
and actuarial fairness of the insurance premiums.  
  Regardless of the actual responses, perhaps most important is the fact that the 
programs do interact with each other in sometimes unpredicted ways.  While the SURE is 
explicitly designed to take into account the crop insurance program, it is essentially a 
“shallow loss” program, and if farmers stack this program on top of a RA crop insurance 
program, it can alter the decisions that the farmer will make, including coverage levels 
adopted and the number of acres planted, thereby introducing potential deadweight 
losses. This suggests that even the careful integration of various programs can still have 
unintended consequences. 28 
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McLean, IL  Corn  183  23.69  20.86  12%  14.89  37%  13.14  45% 
Soybeans  54  14.84  10.60  29%  9.95  33%  8.22  45% 
Hamlin, SD  Corn  131  39.31  36.88  6%  29.22  26%  27.52  30% 
Soybeans  38  23.89  20.25  15%  19.01  20%  15.61  35% 
S. Wheat  52  21.48  17.64  18%  13.52  37%  13.12  39% 
McLeod, MN  Corn  162  29.55  26.79  9%  21.96  26%  20.97  29% 
Soybeans  44  17.03  12.96  24%  10.88  36%  9.99  41% 
S. Wheat  50  20.56  16.83  18%  12.79  38%  12.12  41% 
 
a Revenue assurance with base price option, 70% coverage, for basic units (source, RMA/USDA). These are the full premiums 
unsubsidized by the Federal government, i.e., they are (1-0.41)*(farmer paid premium).  
  32 
 
Table 2. Per acre simulated gross farm returns, net insurance indemnities, ad hoc 
payments, and two types of SURE payments (Hyde County, SD spring wheat grower) 
    
90% Empirical 











I.  SURE as actually implemented 
Market revenue  239.94  132.73  0.00  615.29  0.553   
RA Net 
indemnities    12.08  43.60  -8.39  149.79     
SURE payments  2.56  6.83  0.00  24.31     
Ad hoc payments  8.50  21.57  0.00  24.57     
Total revenue  269.93  100.70  152.41  615.73  0.373  -32.55% 
         
II.  Hypothetical SURE without integration with ad hoc disaster assistance 
 
Market revenue  239.94  132.73  0.00  615.29  0.553   
RA Net 
indemnities    12.08  43.60  -8.39  149.79     
HSURE payments  5.06 9.55  0.00  24.31     
Ad hoc payments  8.50  21.57  0.00  24.57     
Total revenue  272.44  99.55  152.41  615.73  0.365  -34.00% 
 
 
Notes: Unlike this actual SURE program, this hypothetical SURE program (denoted as HSURE) 
does not includes ad hoc payments in the disaster calculation. We assume the Revenue 
Assurance insurance coverage rate is 70%.  Total revenue includes direct payments. The total 
revenue value excludes all costs except for the farmer-paid insurance premiums.  The county 
level SURE trigger is triggered by disaster declarations for corn, spring wheat, or soybeans in 
Hyde County.  Simulations of disaster declarations in counties adjacent to Hyde are not 
conducted due to substantial non-reporting by NASS of yield data for those counties.   
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Table 3.  Simulation results for the EU maximizing Hyde County, SD, Spring Wheat 
Farmer  (farmer is moderately risk averse)
d 






















b / Land 










coverage (θ) Acres 
a) No insurance   --   --  --  1.83 
b) RA insurance  0.67  0.80  0.80  2.84 
c) RA insurance 
and ad hoc 
 payments   0.65  0.80  0.80  3.03 
d) RA insurance 
and HSURE   0.75  0.80  0.80  3.12 
e) RA ins, 
HSURE and 
ad hoc 0.75  0.80  0.80  2.94 
f) RA ins, 
SURE and ad 
hoc 0.75  0.80  0.80  2.90 
a Acreage is fixed at 1.827. 
bThe farmer’s actuarially fair RA crop insurance premium is multiplied by 1/(1-0.59) before the 
government premium subsidy is applied to produce a premium that is actuarially fair on average 
after the federal premium subsidy is applied. 
cThe farmer’s RA crop insurance premium is actuarially correct before the federal crop insurance 
premium subsidy is applied. 
dThe farmer has a risk premium of 20%. 
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Figure 1. Graphical Depiction of Overlap between Two Support Programs 



























                   
 